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STANDING, MOOTNESS, AND FEDERAL RULE 23-
BALANCING PERSPECTIVES
MARY KAY KANE*
The struggle between the maintenance of these traditional rules [gov-
erning standing to sue] and the growth of class and public-interest
actions reflects perhaps the most heated ideological struggle of our
century---between solitary individualism and laissez-faire, on the one
hand, and a social conception of the law, the economy, and the state's
role, on the other.'
n traditional public interest SUitS2 in the federal courts, standing and
mootness have been used to assure that the action properly raises
issues which should be decided by the courts. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that courts have also invoked these two concepts as threshold
requirements for the maintenance of federal class actions.
Although the standing doctrine was developed in suits seeking
review of administrative or legislative decision making, federal courts
continue to utilize the same standing requirements for both individual
and class suits, with very little consideration of whether the doctrine
serves a functional purpose when applied to federal class actions, or
whether standing to sue and standing to act as a class representative
should be two separate concepts.4 In contrast, the Supreme Court re-
cently has attempted to provide some specific-by no means exhaus-
tive---guidelines regarding the interplay of mootness6 and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the class action provision. It is particularly
important to consider the current state of the law on both these issues,
since the way in which standing and mootness concepts are applied
to class actions may have a significant effect on the scope and character
*Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of
Law and Jurisprudence. A.B., University of Michigan, 1968; J.D., University of Michi-
gan, 1971.
1. Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil
Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REv. 793, 855 (1975).
2. For purposes of this article, further references to public interest suits will denote
suits other than class actions, although it is recognized that the class action is a form
of public interest suit. Cf. text accompanying notes 30-40 infra.
3. See cases cited note 19 infra.
4. See Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 430,
454 (1973).
5. See text accompanying notes 75-109 infra.
6. Mootness may be viewed as a "standing concept." See note 69 & text accom-
panying notes 110-13 infra.
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of class relief and will necessarily affect the extent to which class suits
may be used to protect the public interest.
This article examines the application of standing and mootness
concepts to actions brought under rule 23. It is submitted that although
the potential for abuse and strike suitism is enormous, an analysis of
the structure and function of the class suit and its differences from
other types of public interest litigation suggests that rigid standing and
mootness requirements may not be a necessary or desirable way of reg-
ulating class actions. The differences between the two types of litigation
suggest alternative means of satisfying the objectives of each. By ap-
proaching the problem functionally-that is, by examining the ends
the requirements serve and the other ways those results can be achieved
-a means of meeting those objectives will be provided, without inject-
ing the amorphous, confused law of standings and mootness in gen-
eral public interest suits into the already complex certification proce-
dure for class actions. As suggested by one noted jurist, "We want to
control, we want to prevent abuses. We do not want to really kill this
little beastie. We do not want to so entangle it so that it cannot be used
effectively."9
I. A FUNcTIoNAL ANALYsIs
A functional analysis of standing and mootness reveals that each
serves two major purposes. The first is to ensure that the case or con-
troversy requirement of article III, section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution is satisfied and that a "justiciable" issue is presented. The
second is prudential, rather than constitutional."0 It addresses the
7. A functional analysis of standing generally is provided in Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HlAv. L. Rzv. 645, 669-90 (1973).
8. Mr. justice Frankfurter has referred to the law of standing as "this complicated
specialty of federal jurisdiction .... ." Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
9. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 304 (1973).
10. The question whether standing is constitutionally mandated or merely involves
an exercise of judicial self-restraint has been greatly debated. See generally Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J.
816 (1969); Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363 (1973). Although there is no doubt that those elements of the requirement
focusing on the need to present issues in an adversary context are necessitated by arti-
cle III, section 2, it also is certain that the Supreme Court frequently has utilized a
rigid standing requirement in order to avoid deciding certain issues. Thus, the Court
itself has recognized that its standing decisions often reflect both constitutional and
policy considerations. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 & n.20 (1968). More-
over, in one case it noted that "where. a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question
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question whether the plaintiff is the proper or adequate representative
-whether he truly will protect the public interest." As to class actions,
this latter element finds legislative expression in the requirements of
rule 23.12 And it is the very presence of the statutory prerequisites in
whether the litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular is-
sue,' . . . is one within the power of Congress to determine." Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972). But cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 132
(1940).
11. "The standing requirement serves many purposes, including that of seeing to
it that claims are prosecuted to binding resolution on the merits only by those with a
sufficient interest to assure an informed and effective presentation." Ripon Soc'y, Inc.
v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12.
Rule 23.
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individ-
ually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
1976-77]
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federal class actions that argues for a shift in focus, de-emphasizing the
role that traditional, broad-ranging standing or mootness inquiries
must play in that context.
It may appear to be academic whether a court considers the dis-
missal of a suit for failure to fall within the permissible scope of federal
judicial power or for failure to meet the rule's prerequisites. As will
be seen, however, focusing on rule 23 allows the court much greater
discretion in deciding whether to permit the action to proceed, 18 al-
though in many instances dismissal will result regardless of which ap-
proach is taken. 14 In others, however, a two-part inquiry into (1)
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identi-
fied through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A)
the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date;(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall in-
dude and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify ordescribe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was di-
rected, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining
the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition
or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring,
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair con-
duct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may di-
rect to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the pro-
posed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) im-
posing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requir-
ing that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to
representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly;(5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined
with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be de-
sirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs. As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.
13. See text accompanying notes 114-34 infra.
14. In La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973), the
Ninth Circuit refused class treatment, finding that the action did not meet three of
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whether a case or controversy is presented, and (2) whether the re-
quirements of rule 23 are met, may permit the continuation of the
litigation.15
A functional approach to the problem also better clarifies the
reasons some class actions pass the threshold, while others do not. A
brief foray into the current case law quickly reveals the need for this
clarification. In general public interest litigation the courts typically
have failed to separate the constitutional from the prudential aspects
of standing. The result has been a confusing array of cases16 and an
rule 23's requirements: 1) typicality (rule 23(a) (3)); 2) adequacy of representation
(rule 23(a)(4)); and 3) superiority of remedy (rule 23(b)(3)). Most important to
note is that the coures decision was one of policy, which encouraged it to apply the
rule's requirements restrictively. Thus Judge Sneed stated that his finding of inferiority
was "based upon the belief that restrictions on the flexible language of Rule 23 are
a necessary contribution to the effort to avoid the intractable problems of massive class
actions and to maintain a wholesome degree of difference between the judicial and
administrative functions." 489 F.2d at 468. Accord, In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d
86 (9th Cir. 1974). Another court faced with a similar fact situation might rule differ-
ently. See, e.g., Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
15. See, e.g., Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 604, 612 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
See also text accompanying notes 114-34 infra.
In class actions attacking employment discrimination, the courts have generally
permitted the plaintiff to challenge all the employer's racially motivated practices, even
though the representative has not suffered directly as a result of some of them. See, e.g.,
Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518
F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Ar-
lington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973). How-
ever, these cases may reflect the courts' more liberal treatment of standing in civil
rights actions, rather than the fact that they were class actions.
16. Although it is outside the scope of this article to explain in detail the various
twists and turns taken by the Supreme Court in applying the standing doctrine, a brief
sketch illustrates why it would be undesirable to attempt to apply the doctrine auto-
matically in class actions.
Standing cases may be divided into two -classes: those asserting statutory review
and those involving non-statutory review. In the latter, the Supreme Court has been
slow to permit expanded notions of the plaintiff's right to bring suit. Reflecting the
Court's concern for separation of powers, the "direct injury" test was first set forth in
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). Gradually this test evolved into
one based on whether the plaintiff possessed a "legal right"-in other words, whether
the plaintiff could have brought an action if the defendant had been a private citizen
rather than the government. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939). The first major move toward a more functional approach to standing prob-
lems occurred in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In that case the Court permitted
plaintiff voters to challenge a claimed impairment of their rights resulting from allegedly
improper apportionment in the state legislature. Rather than focusing on the rights
involved and the merits of the claim, the Court stated that the proper question was:
"Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional ques-
tions?" Id. at 204. This functional approach and the rejection of separation of powers
criteria for deciding standing questions were carried to their peak in Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968), in which the Court said, "when standing is placed in issue in a
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even more overwhelming display of articles analyzing and criticizing
the court decisions17 and suggesting alternative approaches.
18
case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party
to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable." Id. at 99-100.
Two 1974 Supreme Court decisions seem to have halted this movement toward
a functionally oriented law of standing and signalled a return to a more conceptualistic
approach. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). As summarized in 13 C. WRioHT,
A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 221 (1975),
these cases
have reestablished the dedication of the Supreme Court to Article III limits on
standing, expressed in the traditionally confusing terms of direct injury and
justified by a renewed emphasis on separation of powers principles. It is once
again clear ... in these and other recent decisions that standing concepts
may at times be intermingled with other elements of justiciability, particularly
ripeness, mootness, and political questions.
The Court's renewed emphasis on the need for a direct injury, see Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976), and the increased burden
this places on plaintiffs is made even more clear in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975). In that case the Supreme Court denied standing to plaintiffs challenging local
zoning ordinances that allegedly excluded low income individuals and, concomitantly,
ethnic or racial minorities, despite allegations that the plaintiffs themselves had been
so excluded. The Court placed a very heavy burden of pleading on the plaintiffs, re-
quiring them to show that in fact they could have found suitable housing but for the
effect of the ordinances. Id. at 502.
The Supreme Court has been much more liberal in its treatment of standing in
the statutory review area, recognizing the congressional desire for judicial supervision
of federal agency activity. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,
14 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). The test that
has gradually evolved requires the plaintiff to show "injury in fact, economic or other-
wise," and that the plaintiff's interest is "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Although what constitutes a "zone of interests"
remains somewhat unclear, the broadened scope of standing in this area lies in the
fact that the plaintiff may be permitted to bring suit even when the only injury claimed
is to abstract, non-economic interests. See United States v. Students Challenging Regu-
latory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972). Thus, absent a similar retreat by the Court in the statutory area,
there is a marked distinction between statutory and non-statutory standing, with the
latter presenting a much greater barrier to access to the federal courts.
17. See, e.g., Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REV. 601 (1968); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. CHr. L. REV. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing to Secure judicial Review: Public
Actions, 74 HTv. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Ac-
tions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968);
Scott, supra note 7; Comment, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the
Public Citizen, 24 As. U.L. REV. 835 (1975); Note, Recent Standing Cases and a
Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HAsTINGs L.J. 213 (1975).
18. Alternatives for the standing test are many and varied. Some suggest dis-
carding entirely the focus on the plaintiff's injury and relying instead on a test centered
on the issues involved and the propriety of deciding those issues. See, e.g., Homburger,
Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L.
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Even more perplexing is the comparable case law in class actions.
Most frequently the courts simply note that in actions brought under
rule 23 the class representative must have standing in order to be an
adequate representative. 9 But what does this mean? To the extent that
standing is designed to assure that the plaintiff is the proper repre-
sentative, it is tautological. To the extent that standing requires the
representative to demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim does
not violate historic notions of separation of powers, the requirement is
meaningless in suits challenging private activity.20 Thus, in many in-
stances all the courts seem to be concerned with is that the representa-
tive have a claim for relief2' or that he be a member of the class. 22 As
will be shown in Part V, however, the fact that the representative has
a claim for relief is just one element of the complex question of
Rnv. 343, 408 (1974); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971); Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plain-
tiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That:
A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479, 511 (1972). One author argues that
standing concerns are essentially the same as those utilized when determining whether
a cause of action is presented, so that the doctrines developed to govern inquiries into
the presence of a claim for relief might be utilized, avoiding the more abstract and
poorly focused decisions which the current approach causes. See Albert, supra note 17.
Another suggests alternatives for determining what constitutes a judicially cognizable
injury. See Note, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 213, 234 (1975). Professor Davis offers a list of fourteen propositions
designed to simplify and systematize the law of standing. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers
and Others, 35 U. OHi. L. Rvv. 601, 628 (1968).
19. Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 24 n.28a (3d
Cir. 1975); Connor v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, 378 F. Supp. 1069
(E.D. Pa. 1974), modified, 68 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Al Barnett & Son, Inc.
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); Mojica v. Automatic Em-
ployees Credit Union, 363 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Il1. 1973), vacated sub nom. Gonzalez
v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974); Albertson's Inc. v. Ainalga-
mated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43, 55 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 503
F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974).
20. Of course, in class actions challenging agency or legislative activity as uncon-
stitutional, concerns of separation of powers should play their normal role. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). Even in
those instances, however, the issue of whether the plaintiff has "standing" to sue as
a class representative should be kept distinct from whether he has standing to bring
the action. Thus, in Schlesinger the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiffs could main-
tain the representative action since their interest was "undifferentiated" from that of
the other members, 418 U.S. at 217, but dismissed the suit because plaintiffs' failure
to show a concrete injury meant that they lacked "citizen standing."
21. See, e.g., White v. Deltona Corp., 66 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Gordon
v. Fundamental Investors, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 62 F.R.D. 43 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974).
22. See, e.g., Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975);
Connor v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, 378 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), modified, 68 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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whether he is an adequate representative.3 Focusing on the presence
of a claim for relief or class membership also fails adequately to address
the underlying concerns of the case and controversy requirement.2 4
Rather, it is necessary to consider the policies behind this constitutional
limitation in order to ascertain whether the class action may be
brought. The remainder of this article will illustrate this proposition,
analyzing first the constitutional and then the prudential elements of
standing and mootness in rule 23 actions.
II. THE CLASs ACrION AS A PUBLIC INTEREST SUIT
Before turning to the application of standing and mootness con-
cepts in class actions, it is important to consider how the class action
is related to the general public interest suit. There has always been
public interest litigation in our society.25 Originally, and most com-
monly, the term referred to suits challenging some governmental ac-
tion as violative of the statutory or constitutional rights of a segment
of the public. As corporations flourished in the business world, the
term was expanded to embrace actions challenging private activity,
but activity which, because of the size of big business, necessarily af-
fected large numbers of citizens and thereby merited the "public in-
terest" classification. Shareholder derivative suits, brought because
of an alleged injury to the corporation through mismanagement by
some members of the board of directors, fit this description in that they
promote the public interest by protecting the rights of the sharehold-
ers and, even more generally, by deterring bad business practices and
monitoring corporate activities.26
23. See text accompanying notes 114-35 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
25. A thorough discussion of the various types of public interest litigation may be
found in Homburger, supra note 18.
26. The history of the shareholder derivative suit provides an interesting parallel
to the current controversy surrounding class actions. Prior to the adoption of require-
ments limiting the powers of a shareholder to initiate and terminate such actions at
will, stockholder suits invited abuse and strike suitism because the corporate defendants
could buy off the plaintiff with a private settlement. However, these types of abuses,
which are some of those alleged to pertain to class actions, were adequately curtailed
by the adoption of federal rule 23 in 1938 [now federal rule 23.1] and comparable
state legislation that established requirements designed to ensure that frivolous suits
were not brought and that derivative actions were not settled in order to benefit the
plaintiff only. See Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions, 22
Sw. L.J. 767 (1968), 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969); McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-
Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421 (1936). See generally
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1821-41 (1972).
[Vol. 26
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Far more controversial and potentially more useful is the class ac-
tion as a means of protecting the public interest. A class action is
brought by one or more persons suing on behalf of themselves and
other individuals who allegedly possess similar grievances. Conversely,
an action may be brought against a group of, individuals who, it is
claimed, have in some similar way wronged the plaintiff. One rationale
for allowing this representative proceeding is that the joinder of all the
persons similarly situated to the representative would be "impracti-
cable" 27 and that some procedure is necessary so that sheer numbers
do not prevent the assertion of legal rights.2 Thus, the device pro-
vides an efficient and economical means for the courts and the parties
to try a case in which there are common interests. 29
More than efficiency and judicial economy is served, however, and
it is these added functions which merit the application of the term
"public interest suit" to class actions.30 Because of our mass economy,
dominated by big businesses, monolithic governmental structures, and
burgeoning bureaucracy, it is not unusual for the decision or practice
of one government or corporate official to affect thousands or even
millions of citizens. If that decision or practice is illegal or otherwise
improper, all those persons will suffer. However, each individual may
be able to prove only a small amount of actual damages, and individ-
ual statutory penalties may be small. For example, a lender's violations
of the Federal Truth in Lending Act by failure to show the annual
percentage rate on monthly bills merits only a $100 minimum pen-
alty.31 Clearly, this is not enough to provide incentive for most in-
dividuals to sue; and, should a few brave ideologists sue and win, the
penalty does not impose enough of a burden on the defendant to en-
courage compliance with the statute.8 2 Even in consumer antitrust
27. Impracticability of joinder is currently embodied in federal rule 23(a) (1) as
one of the necessary prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action. See 7 0.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 26, § 1762.
28. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
29.
The King of Brobdingnag gave it for his opinion that, "whoever could
make two ears of corn, or two blades of grass to grow upon a spot of ground
where only one grew before, would deserve better of mankind, and do more
essential service to his country than the whole race of politicians put together."
In matters of justice, however, the benefactor is he who makes one lawsuit
grow where two grew before.
Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HAnv. L. REV. 1297 (1932).
30. Cf. note 2 supra.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (2) (A) (Supp. IV 1974).
32. Class actions under the Truth in Lending Act have had mixed success. An
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suits claiming overcharges or a conspiracy to fix prices, the individual
frequently has too little at stake to merit bringing an action. 8 In the
absence of a class action, the financial incentives for attorneys also are
minimal. For example, in suits challenging the segregation of public
school facilities, the amount of attorneys' fees awarded if brought by
one student on his own behalf may be so small that few attorneys will
be willing to conduct the litigation.
The class action fills this void.34 By permitting all those similarly
harmed to join in one suit, the aggregate amount of damages, penal-
ties, or fees provides an incentive to sue and exerts a correlative deter-
rent effect on the defendant. 5 Deterrence is further increased since
initial upsurge of suits was stemmed in 1972 when Judge Frankel held that the class
suit was not a superior method of relief and, indeed, was inconsistent with the statu-
tory remedy because the proposed recovery "of $100 each for some 130,000 class mem-
bers would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any dam-
age to the purported class or to any benefit to defendant .... ." Ratner v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Other courts noted that
class actions were not necessary, since the Act provided for attorney's fees, as well as a
minimum recovery, so that a sufficient incentive for individual suits was present. Mathews
v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 479 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Welmaker v. W.T.
Grant Co., 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972). A few other courts refused to reject
automatically class actions under the statute. See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d
336 (10th Cir. 1973); Turoff v. Union Oil Co. of California, 61 F.R.D. 51 (N.D.
Ohio 1973). These problems under the statute are examined in Note, Recent De-
velopments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 101 (1974). Finally, the statute was amended in 1974 to permit class actions, but
recoveries are limited to the lesser of $100,000 or 1 percent of the creditor's net
worth. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (Supp. IV 1974).
33. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972); In
re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Minnesota v.
United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 572 (D. Minn. 1968).
34. "The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has
against those who command the status quo." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, 3., dissenting in part); accord, Escott v. Barchris Const.
Corp., 340 F.2d 731,, 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382
U.S. 816 (1965); Cappelletti, supra note 1, at 856; Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency,
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. oF LEoAL STUDIES 47 (1975).
35. The current status of attorney fee awards in class actions is somewhat unclear.
Although attorneys' fees have been viewed as an incentive to sue, see note 132 infra,
federal courts are becoming much more restrictive and demanding in an effort to
protect the class action from becoming primarily a strike suit for large fees. See,
e.g., Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Patlogan v. Dickstein, Shapiro & Galligan, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973);
Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 507 F.2d
1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221
(N.D. Ill. 1972). See also Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation § 1.47
(1973 ed.). In addition, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soey, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), may further limit the availability of
awards. The Alyeska decision restricts the substantial benefit theory, which is a common
approach utilized to award fees in class suits, to situations in which the benefit is
readily measurable.
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class suits often are newsworthy, in part simply because of the large
numbers of persons involved. Thus, defendants concerned with their
reputation will want to avoid conduct that might result in a class suit
which could darken their public image. In this way, the class action
fosters and protects the public interest by providing an incentive to
"private attorneys general" 36 and discouraging conduct contrary to the
public interest.
Two important distinctions between class and public interest
suits should be noted. The most obvious is the difference in their
breadth of subject matter: while class actions may be and frequently
are brought to challenge governmental action, they also are available
to attack private activities affecting large numbers of persons. Public
interest suits, on the other hand, typically are limited to challenges to
governmental activity.3 7 The representative character of the actions
also differs. In the class suit the representative is acting on behalf of
a well-defined group of individuals,5 8 and when a judgment is entered
it will bind each and every member of that class 39 Even though the
plaintiff in a public interest suit is acting on behalf of the general
public, his action binds no one; should he lose, some new representa-
tive may take up the staff and begin anew.40 As will be shown, these
distinctions are very important and explain in part why rigid standing
and mootness rules are inappropriate in class actions.
36. The phrase "private Attorney General" was first coined by Judge Jerome
Frank in Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated, 320 U.S.
707 (1943).
37. One exception is the section of the Clean Air Act providing for suits by
private individuals against "any person" violating the noise control standards of the
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a) (1) (1972).
38. The existence of a distinct "class" for whom the representative acts is a
necessary prerequisite to bringing a class action under federal rule 23. See generally
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 26, at § 1760. Although the amount of detail
necessary to define the class adequately depends on the facts of each case, sufficient
information generally must be provided so that the court can determine whether a
person should be considered a member. See Barnett v. W.T. Grant Go., 518 F.2d 543
(4th Gir. 1975); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1970).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Gauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
Whether the broad binding effect of class action judgments may render them more
easily susceptible to collateral attack is a question currently debated. See Note, Col-
lateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HAxv. L. REv. 589
(1974); Gomment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements
in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975).
40. Although res judicata principles do not prevent a second public interest suit
based on the same challenge, stare decisis and the cost of litigation may, however, dis-
courage relitigation as a practical matter.
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III. ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 LIMITATIONS: STANDING As APPLIED IN
CLAss ACTIONS
In public interest litigation, the Supreme Court generally has
defined standing in terms of a threshold inquiry into whether the
claimant has suffered a direct or "actual injury," as opposed to a more
"general" injury.4 1 For constitutional purposes, the requirement of
an "actual injury" assures that the judiciary perform only their proper
role. By barring advisory opinions based on hypothetical questions,
42
and by allowing the courts to rule only when an actual controversy is
present, the Constitution has limited courts to deciding questions pre-
sented in an adversary context-the form historically viewed as best
suited to judicial resolution.43 Focusing on adversariness also helps
preserve the balance and separation of powers that typify the Ameri-
can system of government by three coordinate branches. The federal
courts are prevented, as a jurisdictional matter, from deciding issues
that because of their speculative character or lack of concreteness
involve political judgments that might better be resolved by the legis-
lature or by the executive.44 Consequently, the focal point for proper
judicial intervention is some real injury which has occurred or is
imminent. If this is present, then adjudication is appropriate.
Against this background, the major question in class action litiga-
tion is whose claim should be examined to determine whether the
suit is within the scope of the federal courts' judicial power. Is it suffi-
cient to show that the representative has been injured, even if the
class has not? Can a Black job applicant, allegedly denied employment
41. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
42. See United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961); Electric Bond & Share
Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 41 (3d
ed. 1976).
43. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962).
44. As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95
(1968):
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two complementary
but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And
in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.
The dual function of the case or controversy requirement is also explored in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974).
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because of discriminatory hiring practices, bring suit on behalf of a
class including future applicants? Alternatively, can an action be
brought in federal court when the class claim falls within article III,
even though the plaintiff representative's claim is deficient, as is the
case when the suit involves plaintiff and defendant classes and the
representative necessarily has been injured by only one or a few of
the defendant class members?
A. Allowing the Representative to Satisfy the Requirement
Insofar as standing is viewed as a jurisdictional prerequisite, some
courts have held, relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Snyder v.
Harris45 and Zahn v. International Paper Co.,40 that each and every
member of the class must have standing because to hold otherwise
would be an expansion of the traditional concept of a "case." 47 How-
ever, this is an overly broad application of those two cases. In both
Snyder and Zahn the Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret "case"
broadly was not in deference to constitutional limitations. Rather, it
expressed concern that the issue involved, the statutory amount-in-
controversy requirement, historically had been treated narrowly,4
and to hold differently would be to overlook years of precedent in
analogous cases involving multiple parties.49 No such narrow precedent
exists with regard to the article III, section 2 requirement.
A far better analogy is the application of the diversity require-
ment,50 also of constitutional origin, to class actions. Here it has been
held that diversity may be satisfied by reference solely to the repre-
sentative's citizenship,51 partly in recognition that to require complete
diversity could destroy the class action.
A similar approach with regard to the case or controversy element
of standing seems warranted. To require the class representative to
45. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
46. 414 U.S. 291 (1974).
47. See Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Benecke, 63 F.R.D. 675 (W.D. Mo.
1974); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971); cf. Pennsylvania v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975).
48. 394 U.S. at 338-40.
49. 414 U.S. at 294-95.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
51. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Friedman v.
Meyers, 482 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1973); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76(E.D. Pa. 1970); Day-Brite Lighting Div. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 303
F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Miss. 1969). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. at 340, where
the Court assumed that only the representative's citizenship is relevant for diversity
purposes.
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show that every class member's claim presents an actual controversy
would place a formidable, if not insurmountable, threshold burden
on the courts and parties. Moreover, since by definition the joinder
of the other class members is impracticable, to require proof of the
existence of individualized "cases" would in essence be treating the
class members as parties. To do that is inconsistent with the representa-
tive character of the proceedings. As long as the representative can
show an actual injury, the court need have no concern about render-
ing an advisory opinion, since it is clear that there is an actual and
immediate controversy meriting its attention.52 The threshold require-
ment is met.53
Allowing the class representative's claim to satisfy the constitu-
tional aspects of standing also finds support in the Supreme Court's
treatment of jus tertii claims in general public interest litigation."
Although the Court has held that standing may be found only on the
basis of a claim that a particular statute or act violates the rights of
the plaintiff, there are several cases in which the plaintiff has been
permitted to maintain an action alleging that a particular law injures
him as well as third persons not before the court.5 The litigant is
allowed to press the rights of those third persons because he has a
proper claim himself,5 6 there is some relationship between him and
those whom he seeks to protect,57 and the Court perceives that the only
way in which those third-party rights will be protected adequately is
through such a representative proceeding.58 The important thing to
note about this line of cases is that the Supreme Court has not treated
as a constitutional issue the question of whether jus tertii should be
permitted in a particular action, but has handled the question as a
matter of discretion.59 Similarly, once the class representative demon-
52. See Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
53. The fact that the court need not look to each class member's claim in order
to assure that article III, § 2 is satisfied does not mean that the question whether
the class members have actually suffered an injury is irrelevant. Rather, that issue may
be considered when deciding how to define the class, see, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517
F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975), or on a subsequent motion for summary judgment.
54. See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Su.
preme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii, 88 HARv. L. Rv. 423 (1974).
55. See cases cited note 57 infra.
56. The absence of a personal claim necessitates dismissal. See, e.g., Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
57. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
58. See cases cited note 57 supra.
59. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court referred to its general
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strates that his claim falls within article III, section 2, it should be
within the trial court's discretion to allow the action to proceed as a
class suit. A female employee challenging discriminatory employment
practices dearly has standing to sue on behalf of future employees if
she has been harmed.60 Whether she should be allowed to represent
those individuals is a discretionary matter to be decided in light ofthe
policies and requirements of rule 23.
B. Allowing the Class to Satisfy the Requirement
The converse question, whether the class claim, rather than the
representative's claim, can be allowed to satisfy the standing require-
ment, has posed much more difficulty for the federal courts. Arguably,
as long as an actual controversy between the class and the opposing
party is presented, article III, section 2 should not present a barrier
to the institution of a federal class action. If the class claim presents a
case or controversy or if unnamed class members clearly have been
injured, the representative's failure to show individual harm should
not present a constitutional problem. Rather, it should be considered
in determining his fitness under the requirements of rule 23.
Despite the seeming logic of this conclusion, the use of class stand-
ing as the sole basis for instituting an action has been rejected by the
courts.01 To avoid dismissal based on a lack of standing, the named
rule forbidding the assertion of third-party rights as "self-imposed," pointing to in-
stances in which it had been relaxed. Id. at 444.
60. See, e.g., Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 409 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Wis. 1976). See also
cases cited note 15 supra.
61. See Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466 (D. Md. 1975); Chevalier
v. Baird Sav. Ass'n, 66 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Leonard v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Black Bros. Combined
of Richmond, Inc. v. Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Va. 1974); Kister v. Ohio
Bd. of Regents, 365 F. Supp. 27 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1117 (1974);
Husbands v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Weiner v. Bank of
King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
On the other hand, actions between plaintiff and defendant classes have been
permitted-thus necessarily approving class standing-when the defendants are offi-
cials or instrumentalities of a single state or governmental unit charged with uniformly
applying a statute or regulation. See, e.g., Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1238
(N.D. Ind. 1976); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
However, these cases are only of marginal precedential value since, as expressed by one
court:
In such a case an action against the defendant class is simply a procedural
alternative to challenging the constitutionality of the statute by suit against
the state directly-a procedural device perhaps sometimes required by the
legal fictions surrounding the interplay in the case law between the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct.
441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).
Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 528 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
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representative must show that he has suffered or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some personal injury.62 While the imposition of
this requirement on the class representative appears unnecessary in
view of a viable class claim for relief, it is consistent with the Supreme
Court's continued rejection of the ideological plaintiff in general
public interest suits.63 Moreover, although the Court's rejection of
class standing can be deplored, it appears to be so firmly entrenched
that arguments to the contrary would be futile at this time. Those
decisions do not foreclose another line of development, however. Class
standing clearly remains as a possibility in cases between plaintiff and
defendant classes in which the representative can claim an injury, but
the injury was inflicted by only one defendant class member, not by
each individual in the class. Two companion cases arising in the Ninth
Circuit, La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., and Kinsling v. Alle-
gheny Airlines,6" illustrate the problem.
In La Mar the plaintiff represented a class of consumers who were
customers of a class consisting of all the pawnbrokers licensed to do
business in Oregon. Plaintiff sought $100 per customer or double the
finance charges for alleged violations of the Federal Truth in Lending
Act. Plaintiff representative was injured by, and thus could present an
actual controversy with regard to, only one of the defendants. Kinsling
involved a suit under the Federal Aviation Act by a class of airline
passengers claiming that defendant class members had all violated the
statute by overcharging for connecting flights. Again, plaintiff had been
overcharged by only one of the airlines in the defendant class and did
not have a personal claim with regard to the other defendant class
members. "Class standing" was necessary for continued maintenance
of the suit.
Judge Sneed, writing for the appellate court, expressed great
concern that the class action was threatening to change the traditional
role of the judiciary, shifting the balance of power from the adminis-
trative process to the courts. In addition, he noted the large numbers
of class actions flooding the courts, the possible strike-suit potential
of the device, and the potential burden on the defendants of enormous
class recoveries for technical statutory violations. Faced with similar
62. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); Urban Contractors Alli-
ance v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 531 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1976). But cf. Thurston v.
Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976).
63. See note 16 supra.
64. 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
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circumstances, other courts had suggested that article III, section 2
should be used as a means of limiting or restricting class suits.0 5 How-
ever, Judge Sneed refused to hold that standing was lacking and recog-
nized that the presence of a case or controversy must be tested against
the background of the entire action: 66
No one contends, of course, that there is no case or controversy
between the defendants who seek in these cases to be dismissed and
their customers. The issue upon which we turn these cases is whether
the plaintiff in each case can represent such customers under
Rule 23.67
The Ninth Circuit's rejection of the attempt to add standing as
another preliminary, complex issue in class action litigation can only
be applauded. Furthermore, the decision recognizes quite properly
that by and large the case or controversy requirement should not pose
any threshold problems in class actions between plaintiff and defend-
ant classes. In those instances the court need not worry that the issues
lack concreteness or that the parties are not adverse, since those re-
quirements are clearly satisfied by the representative's individual claim.
Rather, the appropriate concern is whether the plaintiff, having such
a limited interest, will represent the other class meiabers adequately.6 8
A parallel analysis can be applied to the related doctrine of mootness.69
IV. ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 LIMITATIONS: MooTNEss As APPLIED
IN CLASS ACTIONS
In public interest suits, the plaintiff must show not only an actual
controversy at the outset, but also a "live" case throughout the litiga-
tion. 70 If the conduct that is being challenged has ceased, or the plain-
65. E.g., Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
66. See Baird v. Lynch, 890 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Haas v. Pittsburgh
Nat'l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 604 (W.D. Pa. 1973). On appeal from a decision later in the
Haas case, the Third Circuit also approved the two-part approach taken in La Mar.
Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 526 F.2d 1083, 1088 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Roberts
v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973).
67. 489 F.2d at 464.
68. See text accompanying notes 114-36 infra.
69. The mootness and standing doctrines are analogous in many respects. Indeed,
it has been suggested that mootness is "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame."
Monaghan, supra note 10, at 1384. Nonetheless, there are some definite differences in
the way in which the Supreme Court has treated mootness questions. See generally
13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 16, § 3533; Note, The Mootness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REv. 373, 376-77 (1974).
70. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974).
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tiff's individual claim has been satisfied, then any decision by the court
will be advisory l and outside the permissible scope of judicial power
under article III, section 2. The action must be dismissed as moot
even though other members of the public may continue to be injured
by the defendant's conduct.
By contrast, prior to 1975 the courts generally held that the fact
that the representative's claim became moot did not necessitate the
dismissal of a class action.72 The courts implicitly recognized the dis-
tinction between class actions and other public interest suits. However,
little attempt was made to explain the result reached; the courts seemed
to be acting in recognition of the need for expanded treatment with-
out analyzing why it was proper. In 1975, the Supreme Court finally
attempted to set some guidelines that the lower courts might follow
in applying the doctrine of mootness to class actions.7 3 That decision
sets the stage for future developments in the class action field.
A. The Class Given Separate Status
Sosna v. Iowa74 involved a constitutional challenge to a state statute
requiring one year's residency within the state before an individual
71. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); North Carolina v. Rice, 404
U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969).
72. See, e.g., Doe v. Mundy, 514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975); Workman v. Mitchell,
502 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1974); Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973);
Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3rd Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 338 (1975). For an analysis of
several pre-1975 decisions, see Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Ac-
tions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duxc L.J. 573.
73. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Sosna actually was not the first
class action case to present a mootness problem to the Supreme Court. In Richardson
v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1973), the Court denied a moomess claim in a California state
class action brought by three ex-felons on behalf of all other ex-felons similarly
situated. The plaintiffs sued three county election officials as representatives of all
other such officials challenging the constitutionality of their disenfranchisement under
California law. The defendants had agreed to allow the named plaintiffs to register to
vote. The California court ruled that the action could continue even though those
plaintiffs no longer were members of the class they sought to represent. The Supreme
Court affirmed on the ground that a live controversy still remained, 418 U.S. at 34-36,
and that "California is at liberty to prescribe its own rules for class actions .... t
Id. at 39.
Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972), and Super Tire
Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 126 (1974), class actions were allowed to pro-
ceed even though the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot. In those cases, how-
ever, the Court focused on the issue, rather than the class aspects of the actions,
finding in both cases that it would be "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
'unless a decision were rendered.
74. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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could obtain a divorce or legal separation there. Plaintiff, who had
been in the state for one month, sued on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated.7 Although the plaintiff had not satisfied the
durational residency requirement at the time the trial court rendered
its decision, her claim was moot by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court.7 6 In an opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, the Court
held that the action could continue and that a live controversy was
present.
The Court's decision was based on two findings, both of which
support a functional approach. First, the Court found that, despite the
mootness of the plaintiff's claim, a case still was present involving the
other class members and the state. If plaintiff had sued only on her
own behalf, dismissal of the suit would have been necessary, even
though other persons in Iowa might be subject to the allegedly un-
constitutional requirement. However, "[w]hen the District Court cer-
tified the propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed persons
described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the
interest asserted by appellant." 77 One of the things which gave the class
this separate status was the fact that the unnamed members would
be bound by the judgment.78 Thus, the Court explicitly recognized
that class actions should be treated differently from other public
interest suits and that the class, as a whole, may meet the case or
controversy requirement.
The second factor on which the Court relied was the need for
judicial intervention in cases in which the issue-for example, a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a short statutory durational require-
ment-would otherwise escape full appellate review because of the
slowness of the judicial process. This factor had already been col-
sidered in previous Supreme Court decisions which allowed an excep-
tion to the mootness doctrine for cases in which the plaintiff might
again be subject to the challenged conduct.79 In Sosna the exception
was expanded to cover cases in which the other non-party class mem-
75. Plaintiff described the class as "'those residents of the State of Iowa who
have resided therein for a period of less than one year and who desire to initiate ac-
tions for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, and who are barred from doing
so by the one-year durational residency requirement embodied in Sections 598.6 and
598.9 of the Code of Iowa.'" 419 U.S. at 397.
76. Id. at 398.
77. Id. at 399.
78. Id. n.8.
79. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
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bers were or could be affected by defendant's activities.80 However, as
explained in a more recent decision,"' the Court's use of this second
factor was merely to demonstrate that Sosna was consistent as a matter
of policy with its earlier mootness decisions.82 A demonstration of the
need for review is not necessary to allow a class action to continue,
since, "[g]iven a properly certified class action, Sosna contemplates that
mootness turns on whether, in the specific circumstances of the given
case at the time it is before this Court, an adversary relationship suffi-
cient to fulfill this function exists." 3
A strong dissent8 4 by Justice White points out just how far-reaching
Sosna might be. As he notes, the traditional function of the case or
controversy requirement was to weed out those cases brought by per-
sons having no personal stake in the outcome. By failing to dismiss
in Sosna, the Court allowed a new type of suit to be entertained in
the public interest, expanding the limited class of cases that typically
have been permitted:
The unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed litigants
remain. None of the anonymous members of the class is present to
direct counsel and ensure that class interests are being properly
served. For all practical purposes, this case has become one-sided
and has lost the adversary quality necessary to satisfy the constitu-
tional "case or controversy" requirement. A real issue unquestionably
remains, but the necessary adverse party to press it has disappeared.8 5
There is no doubt that Justice White is correct in his assessment
that Sosna marks an endorsement of the class action as a public in-
terest suit-an endorsement all the more bewildering against the back-
ground of recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the mainten-
ance of federal class actions.80 In addition, the balance of power may
80. The injection of this second factor into the mootness inquiry is severely criti-
cized in 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. CooPER, supra note 16, § 3533, at 82-83
(1976 Supp.).
81. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).
82. Id. at 1260 n.8.
83. Id. at 1260.
84. 419 U.S. at 410.
85. Id. at 412.
86. The first limitation on federal class actions was the Supreme Court's ruling
that each member of the class must satisfy the statutory amount in controversy re-
quirements. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The availability of federal class action relief was further
restricted in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), which held that
federal rule 23(c) (2) requires individual notice to all identifiable class members, that
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be altered somewhat because some of the cases that now may be per-
mitted previously would have been handled by the political process.8 7
However, the fact that the balance of power is being readjusted and
that more cases are being litigated in the federal courts does not of
itself mean that the case or controversy limitation has been ignored.
Article III, section 2 does not establish any precise rule as to what
constitutes a case or controversy.88 Instead, the requirement has been
interpreted flexibly, taking into account whether the issue presented
is one best suited to judicial resolution or one that should be left to
the political process.89 Moreover, as already has been illustrated, since
a live, concrete controversy must be present in the claims of the other
class members, there need be no concern about rendering an advisory
opinion. If the claims of the other members of the class also are moot,
of course the action will have to be dismissed. 0 The objections voiced
by the Sosna dissent pertained to whether the plaintiff was an adequate
representative in light of her moot claim, not whether the case was
within the permissible scope of federal judicial power.
B. The Importance of Class Certification
Although Sosna firmly establishes the unique characteristics of the
class action that justify its special treatment when moomess is at issue,
it is unclear just how far this interpretation of the case or controversy
requirement can be carried. In Sosna itself the action had been cer-
tified as a proper class action under federal rule 23.9- Consequently,
a preliminary hearing to determine how to allocate the costs of notice is improper, and
that the plaintiff is required to absorb the entire cost of sending notice even if that
cost would be prohibitive and result in the suit being abandoned.
87. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 1383. See also Mishkin, Foreword: The
High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HAnv. L.
REv. 56 (1965).
88. A good example of the flexibility of the article III restrictions generally is
the judicially developed doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Under that doctrine, the federal courts are
permitted to decide claims based solely on state law and not falling within their con-
stitutionally established jurisdictional scope. As the Supreme Court noted in Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 (1970), the rationale for this expansion of jurisdiction is
simply "the commonsense policy" of "the conservation of judicial energy and the avoid-
ance of multiplicity of litigation."
89. See note 16 supra.
90. See, e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969).
91. There have been several cases subsequent to Sosna in which class certification
took place and the action was allowed to proceed after the representative's claim be-
came moot. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Doe v. Mundy,
514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975); Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs. 410
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various alternative protections provided in the rule ensured that the
cage was presented in a truly adversarial manner.92 What should be
the result if certification has not yet taken place when the representa-
tive's claim becomes moot? Should the action be treated as an in-
dividual public interest suit until certified under rule 28, with the
result that mootness of the plaintiff's claim requires dismissal?
There are several reasons for treating the suit as a class action,
when it has been pleaded as such, even before certification. The fact
that the action has not yet been properly certified does not mean that
it is not a proper class action. 93 Indeed, the various protective pro-
cedures available in the class action rule will be utilized until certifica-
tion is denied.4 Federal rule 23(c)(1) merely urges the court to de-
cide the class issue "as soon as practicable" after the commencement
df the action.95 In some cases discovery may be necessary to decide how
to describe the class properly.96 In others, the class issue may be inter-
twined with the merits and may be postponed until some later stage
in the proceedings.97
F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Torres v. Butz, 397 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1975);
Plato v. Roudebrush, 397 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1975). See also Cruz v. Hauck, 515
F.2d 322, 325 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975) (parties treated case as though a proper certifica-
tion had been made).
92. See text accompanying notes 114-35 infra.
,93. It has been suggested that a rule of presumptive validity of class actions
should apply until an adverse determination is made under rule 23(c)(1). 3B J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 1 23.50 (2d ed. 1975); Bledsoe, supra note 4, at 447.
94. For example, under rule 23(e) notice and court approval are required for
any proposed settlement of a class action. It has been held that these requirements
pertain even prior to any rule 23(c) (1) determination so as to prevent strike suits and
to ensure that the interests of the absent members are protected. See Ace Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
95. Although the courts have recognized the need for an early determination, see,
e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), certification has been de-
layed as much as one year after the filing of the complaint, see Souza v. Scalone, 64
F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1974), and has even been considered for the first time on ap-
peal, see Locke v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 499 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1974). But see
Raschio v. Sinclair, 486 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1973).
. 96. See, e.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Yaffe v.
Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972).
97. In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974), the Court of Appeals postponed the class determination until
after liability had been decided in order to save the judicial system the time and ex-
pense of dealing with the various class action questions and procedures. The result of
the court's decision is to turn the class action into a test case unless or until plaintiffs
win on the merits. Thus, Katz can be criticized as not complying with the rule 23(c)(1) directive, but instead determining the class issue "as soon as is necessary."
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Perhaps in recognition of some of these possibilities, the Sosna
Court stated that if the plaintiff's claim became moot "before the dis-
trict court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification
motion," certification might relate back to the filing of the com-
plaint. 8 This decision to allow relation back was made as a matter of
policy, in order to avoid a situation in which an issue would always
be capable of evading review.99 The loophole allows the courts seri-
ously to evaluate the propriety of permitting the suit to continue as
a class action despite the fact that the representative's claim became
moot after the action was filed. If it is clear that the class action
allegations were pleaded in good faith and that the failure to achieve
class certification earlier is not due to any fault of the plaintiff, the
court seriously should consider whether to allow the action to proceed
under rule 23 and should not dismiss it as moot. As recognized by the
Supreme Court, the decision to allow certification to relate back "may
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case."' 100
Despite the soundness of the above approach, its viability is some-
what in doubt because of Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs,'10
a per curiam decision rendered by the Supreme Court shortly after
Sosna. In that case plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all
high school students attending schools managed by the Board. Plain-
tiffs claimed that certain rules and regulations interfered with the
publication and distribution of their student newspapers, in violation
of the first and fourteenth amendments. Apparently no class action
hearing was held, although the district court in its ruling on the per-
manent injunction, stated that "the remaining named plaintiffs are
qualified as proper representatives of the class whose interest they
seek to protect."'1 02 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
the representatives had graduated and the Court held, citing Sosna,
that because "there was inadequate compliance with the requirements
of rule 23(c), we have concluded that the case has become moot."'10 3
98. 419 U.S. at 402 n.11.
99. Id., accord, Naper v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976); Williams v.
Wholgemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1976) ; Inmates of San Diego County Jail v. Duffy,
528 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Andujar v. Weinberger, 69 F.R.D. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Moore v. Matthews, 69 F.R.D. 406 (D. Mass. 1975).
100. 419 U.S. at 402 n.11.
101. 420 U.S. 128 (1975).
102. 349 F. Supp. 605, 611 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
103. 420 U.S. at 129. A later case to similar effect is Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.
v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976).
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Interpreted most restrictively, Jacobs seems to lay down a hard
and fast rule: only actions that have been properly certified under
rule 23(c)(1) can be allowed to continue after the representative's
claim has become moot. Several lower courts, relying on Jacobs, have
ruled accordingly.1°4 This conclusion is buttressed by the Court's
failure, in its brief opinion, even to consider the possibility that cer-
tification might relate back.
The decision need not, indeed should not, be read so broadly.
Jacobs presented a situation that would not have permitted relation
back to operate,10 5 since a final judgment had been entered by the
trial court without a formal class determination. The plaintiffs'
claims did not become moot before there was an opportunity to rule
on the class question. Rather, the lower court appears largely to have
ignored the issue. By failing adequately to identify and describe the
class, the court left open the possibility that it would be treated as
an individual suit on appeal. 06 In that sense, Jacobs stands as a warn-
ing to district judges not to engage in sloppy practices in the future.107
If the representative's claim becomes moot at the trial level before
the court has had an opportunity to make its rule 23(c)(1) decision,
the judge should not feel constrained by Jacobs but should consider
whether approval of class status is appropriate, thereby avoiding dis-
missal.108
104. See Bradley v. Housing Authority, 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975); McCleary
v. Realty Indus., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Va. 1975); Leonhart v. McCormick,
395 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D.
466 (D. Md. 1975). But cf. Allen v. Likins, 517 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1975), in which
the court dismissed the suit but suggested that if the failure to certify before plaintiff's
claim became moot had been due to the court's dilatoriness, dismissal might not be
required.
105. It is worth noting that not only had the named plaintiffs graduated, but the
publication that originated the dispute between the students and the Board was no
longer in existence. 420 U.S. at 133 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Rule 23(c) (3) requires that "[t]he judgment in an action maintained as a
class action . . . shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members
of the class."
107. See 420 U.S. at 133 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano,
96 S. Ct. 1551, 1554 n.1 (1976).
108. See Lugo v. Dumpson, 390 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Cicchetti v.
Lucey, 514 F.2d 362, 367 (1st Cir. 1975), the court of appeals recognized that a class
action might continue prior to certification but after the plaintiff's claim had become
moot. However, it held that the case before it did not fall into that exception, as the
issue involved was not one that otherwise would evade review. This case is now clearly
wrongly decided in light of Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).
Of course, the court when deciding whether to approve class status under these
circumstances can utilize any of the tools provided in rule 23 to give added protection
against abuses. See text accompanying notes 124-28 infra. For example, in one pre-
Sosna case, the court ruled that the action would be dismissed without prejudice
[Vol. 26
FEDERAL RULE 23
Allowing the district court this discretion is essential if defendants
are to be prevented from buying off plaintiffs by settling their in-
dividual claims before the action is properly certified. Fears of such
tactics are not chimerical. For example, in one case the plaintiffs
brought a class action on behalf of public housing applicants who
had been denied housing because of allegedly discriminatory policies
that favored higher-income applicants. Defendants gave apartments to
the named plaintiffs and then moved to dismiss the case as moot since
no certification order had been entered. The appellate court upheld
the trial court's dismissal relying on Jacobs, even though it found that
"[i]n the instant case it is true that the district court failed to take
action on the plaintiffs' motions relating to the certification of the
class. In addition it is conceded that the defendants deliberately mooted
the issue as to the named plaintiffs or intervenors to avoid judicial
review."10
In sum then, it is clear that with regard to questions of mootness,
the unique characteristics of the class action may permit it to continue
even though the named plaintiff no longer possesses a live grievance.
Whether dismissal is governed solely by the fact of a formal rule
23(c) (1) determination prior to the plaintiff losing his claim or by
other, more flexible, factors is an open question. The better decision
is to allow the district court some discretion to permit certification to
relate back when the failure to obtain an earlier determination was
not due to the failure of the plaintiff to raise the question and when
the issue presented is one that might otherwise evade review.
C. Mootness and Standing Compared
Even a cursory comparison of the treatment of mootness and
standing in class actions reveals that the Supreme Court has been
much more willing to accept the notion of independent class status
as satisfying article III, section 2 constraints when the question is
whether the action should be dismissed for mootness. On its face this
difference in treatment appears somewhat anomalous. If both require-
ments are designed to ensure the presence of a live controversy, why
is the class allowed to satisfy this concern in one instance, but not in
the other?
unless, within a specified period, other class members with live claims sought to inter-
vene. taReau v. Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214 (D. Conn. 1974).
109. Bradley v. Housing Authority, 512 F.2d 626, 629 (8th Cir. 1975). A similar
situation arose in McOleary v. Realty Indus., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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The answer lies, at least in part, in the different timing of the
standing and mootness issues. As one commentator has noted,
In mootness cases . . . the fact that standing once existed indicates
both that some resources have probably been invested and that a
factual situation which can be effectively adjudicated is present;
indeed, when a mootness issue arises only after a trial has been held,
the investment is plain, and the existence of a full record for the
appellate court ensures factual concreteness.110
On the other hand a court confronted by a standing challenge at the
outset of the litigation may be legitimately concerned that the issues
lack concreteness and, having invested little energy to date, the court
may have no good reason to allow the action to continue. Thus, the
fact that an expanded notion of class status is proper when mootness
is raised does not necessarily mandate the same treatment when stand-
ing is at issue. Of course, arguments supporting like standards for both
doctrines can be made, but the courts must recognize the need to
foster class actions as public interest suits. Unlike the situation in the
typical public interest suit, the plaintiff representative in a class action
does have a claim against at least one of the defendants and other live
grievances are presented by the other class members, thereby assuring
factual concreteness.
The question of whether standing is to be resolved in favor of
the class or against it-that is, whether article III, section 2 is to be
interpreted liberally or restrictively-is entwined with the ideological
struggle currently taking place in the courts concerning the proper
role for the judiciary in these rapidly changing times."' References
to the Supreme Court's most recent standing cases indicate a desire
to retreat froni an activist role and to leave doubtful matters to be
settled by the political process." 2 Indeed, the Court has specifically
rejected the argument that if the plaintiff is not allowed to litigate
the issue, no one can do so."8 However, the Court has not abandoned
the public interest litigant. In Sosna and other recent mootness cases,
it has interceded even though well-established loopholes existed. It re-
mains to be seen whether a permanent balance has been struck or
110. Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HAxv. L. R.v. 373,
376-77 (1974).
111. See note 1 supra.
112. See note 16 supra.
113. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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whether the Court still may be persuaded to reject a rigid standing
barrier, at least in plaintiff-defendant class suits.
V. ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION AND FEDERAL RULE 23
Without doubt, the expanded treatment just suggested for the
application of the case or controversy requirement results in much
greater emphasis being given to the adequacy-of-representation element
of standing and mootness. That requirement provides the primary
means for sifting out undesirable suits and generally controlling class
actions.1 4 However, the fact that satisfaction of the rule's requirements
may have increased importance does not mean that they must be
applied rigidly. The many protections for the nonparties' interests
provided in rule 23 itself allow a more expanded notion of what con-
stitutes an adequate representative than might be proper in a general
public interest suit. Thus, the fact that the representative no longer
has a claim for relief, or has a claim, but only against one member of
the defendant class, does not necessarily mean that he cannot ade-
quately protect the interests of the class members. His competence must
be evaluated in light of the various other means at the court's disposal
to assure that those interests are safeguarded. It is the presence of these
other protections that may permit the non-Hohfeldian plaintiff to
continue a class suitn1 5 and the absence of these same protections in
other public interest litigation that bars the pure ideologist from the
federal courts. Consequently, a brief look at rule 23 and its require-
ments is now in order.
The drafters of amended rule 23 attempted to provide a func-
tional, pragmatic approach to the determination of whether a class
action is maintainable."1 6 In addition, in order to ensure the binding
effect of any judgment in the action, they included a number of pre-
requisites designed to make certain that there was adequacy of repre-
114. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
115. The special interest of the ideological (non-Hohfeldian) plaintiff in pursuing
a class action even after his personal claim is moot must be examined carefully. Pro-
fessor Degnan argues that decisions permitting civil rights plaintiffs to continue may
not be good authority for a court faced with a consumer action, since those cases "are
manifestations of zeal and dedication to a cause that transcends the individual interest
of the class representative." Degnan, Foreword: Adequacy of Representation in Class
Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 705, 714-15 (1972).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note (Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts), reprinted in 39
F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966).
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sentation and that due process concerns were met. These require-
ments also protect the concerns typically regulated by standing and
mootness, in that they ensure that the suit really is in the interest of
the class and that the plaintiff is the proper party to represent that
interest.
The plaintiff, by showing that the joinder of all the other class
members would be impracticable (23(a)(1)), that questions of law
or fact common to the class exist (23(a) (2)), and, in suits under rule
23(b) (3), that the class suit is superior to other means of relief, amply
demonstrates that the suit is in the public interest. By definition, large
numbers of the public allegedly have been harmed by a similar scheme
or conduct and the class suit presents the best, if not the only, way of
providing effective relief. The requirements that the representative
have claims typical of the other class members (23(a) (3)) and that
there be adequacy of representation (23 (a) (4)) ensure that the plain-
tiff is the proper party to bring suit. The addition of standing and
mootness requirements to this already complex scheme adds little.
Moreover, to the extent that it further complicates the suit with addi-
tional preliminary determinations, it impedes or thwarts the public
interest.
As should be obvious, adequacy of representation under rule
23 (a) (4) is the key factor for determining whether a class action should
be allowed to continue when the representative's claim is in some
way different from those of the other members. The general test ap-
plied is whether the representative possesses characteristics that will
assure the vigorous prosecution or defense of the action.117 To that
end, courts have ruled that the representative's interest cannot con-
flict with the interest of the other class members"" and that he must
be a member of the class he is seeking to represent."19 In this way his
interest is assured and the rejection of purely ideological plaintiffs is
the same as in other public interest suits.
117. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973); Hohmann v.
Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968); In re United States
Financial Sec. Litigation. 69 F.R.D. 24, 36 (S.D. Calif. 1975); Mersay v. First
Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
118. See, e.g., Albertson's, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 503 F.2d 459, 463(10th Cir. 1974); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqiielin, 391 F.2d 555, 562
(2d Cir. 1968). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 26, § 1768.
119. See, e.g., Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073,
1077 (10th Cir. 1975); Wells v. Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 506 F.2d 436, 437 (5th Cir.
1975) ; Garrett v. Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1245 (6th Cir. 1974).
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At first glance, the class membership requirement seems to achieve
the same result that would be achieved by the use of the standing
doctrine-that is, if the plaintiff is not a member of a class of injured
persons, if he has not suffered the same injury, the suit must be dis-
missed.120 If this is so, then one might properly wonder if we are not
merely substituting the term "member" for "standing" and ask what
is gained by changing the terminology. Although several courts ap-
pear to have fallen into this trap,121 it is submitted that the require-
ment of class membership means something other than the presence
of a legal injury and should be interpreted and applied to achieve its
limited purpose.
Membership in the class demonstrates that the representative has
a grievance such that his successful prosecution of the action on behalf
of the class necessarily will redound to his own benefit. However, as a
requirement designed to foster adequacy of representation, it need not
mean that the representative must possess a claim exactly like that of
the other members. 22 Rather, the emphasis should be on whether his
position is similar to that of the absentees. Consequently, in answering
the question whether the representative is a class member, the court
might properly focus on the typicality requirement of 23(a) (3), de-
fining a typical claim as one similar to, but not necessarily co-extensive
with, the claims of the other class members.12s
120. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216
(1974), the Court noted that "[t]o have standing to sue as a class representative it is
essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he must possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he represents .... "
This language is particularly unfortunate in that it appears to suggest a very rigid
membership requirement. However, it should not be applied too literally, since in
Schlesinger itself the Court found the representative's interests to be undifferentiated
from those of the other class members and thus did not rule on the situation in which
the named plaintiffs interests are similar, but not identical.
121. See cases cited note 22 supra. See also Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 249
(D. Minn. 1971), in which the court held that "[i]n order to be a member of a class
it is necessary that each individual have standing to bring the suit in his own right."
122. One commentator has suggested that the representative's interests should be
coextensive with those of the other class members in a defendant class action, in order
to ensure that "all possible defenses should be raised by the representative parties,
particularly when the defenses are a complete bar to liability." Note, Class Actions in
Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474,
481. However, identity of interest may not be necessary in the plaintiff class situation.
See note 123 infra.
123. See Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following
Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 DuKE L.J. 573, 577.
Although courts often state that the named plaintiff must possess interests "coex-
tensive" with those of the other class members, see, e.g., Robertson v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the test that is applied seems to
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Since class membership is only one of the means available to se-
cure adequacy of representation, there is no need for it to be defined
restrictivly. Federal rule 23 provides various additional tools to assure
the propriety of the representation. For example, the court can allow
additional representatives to enter 124 or it can subdi-ide the class to
eliminate potential conflicts of interest. 25 Notice of the action may
be sent out; 20 indeed, in subdivision (b) (3) suits, in which the only
real bond between the class members is the presence of common ques-
tions, individual notice to all identifiable class members is required.127
Notice provides the opportunity for other class members to monitor the
activities of the representative and to intervene or, in some cases, to
opt-out, 28 if they feel that their interests are not being adequately
protected.
One further aspect of class representation should be commented
upon-the role of legal counsel. Although the success of any law suit
depends in part on the ability of the attorneys involved, class actions,
because of their inherent complexity, place even greater emphasis on
the expertise of counsel. Additionally, unlike general public interest
suits, an action under federal rule 23 is structured so as to bind all the
be whether they share common objectives and positions. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361 (D.S.C.
1974); Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84 (D.D.C. 1972);
Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972). Of course, if the
representative's position is markedly different from the other members', the action
must be dismissed. See, e.g., Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia,
67 F.R.D. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
124. See, e.g., Norman v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d
Cir. 1972); Ernst & Ernst v. United States District Court, 457 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir.
1972); Nichols v. Schubert, 71 F.R.D. 578 (E.D. Wis. 1976). See also Bledsoe, supra
note 4, at 461.
125. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); B & B Investment Club v. Kleinert's Inc., 62 F.R.D. 140 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) specifically provides that the court may make an
order
requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the
fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to inter-
vene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action.
See generally 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 26, § 1793.
127. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
128. The opportunity to opt-out is only available to class members in actions brought
under subdivision (b) (3). See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2) (notice to members in (b) (3)
suits should include information on their ability to exclude themselves from the action);
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3) (a judgment in a (b) (3) action shall include all members
to whom notice was provided "and who have not requested exclusion").
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class members to whatever judgment is entered.12 9 Thus, the impor-
tance of ensuring that competent lawyers are involved is apparent,
and courts evaluating whether rule 23(a)(4) has been satisfied have
frequently included the requirement of able and experienced
counsel.130
This recognized propriety of an inquiry into the competence of
plaintiff's lawyer is, at least in part, a recognition of the fact that the
attorney is truly the class representative.' 3' It should be remembered
that the lawyer may have as great an interest as the named plaintiff
in vigorously prosecuting the action because of the potential attorney
fee award if he obtains a judgment that benefits the entire class.' 3 2
Consequently, the fact that the named plaintiff's claim becomes moot
so that technically he is no longer a member of the class or the fact
that plaintiff has been allegedly injured by only one of the members
of a defendant class does not necessitate the conclusion that his limited
interest will result in inadequate representation of the other members.
In general public interest suits, it may be correct to assume that be-
cause the attorney's interests are tied to those of the individual plain-
tiff, the quality of representation is directly dependent upon the in-
terest of the plaintiff. In class actions, however, the presence of the
129. See note 39 supra.
130. See, e.g., Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Amos v. Board of School Di-
rectors, 408 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
131. Degnan, supra note 115 at 715. Professor Dam has argued that the Supreme
Court's rigid reading of the rule 23 notice requirements in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), is implicitly a rejection of the notion of the attorney
as class representative. See Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT.
R V. 97. If he is correct, that position seems particularly unwarranted given the ad-
ditional safeguards provided in the rule itself to ensure adequate representation. See
text accompanying notes 116-28 supra. Moreover, the quality of the representation is
further enhanced in many instances by the fact that class actions frequently are
brought by public interest lawyers or civil rights attorneys. The devotion of these
individuals to their causes makes more than certain the vigorous and wholehearted
prosecution of their cases.
132. A few courts have explicitly recognized that large attorney's fees may pro-
vide an added incentive to counsel's vigorous prosecution of the class action, thereby
further assuring adequacy of representation. See, e.g., Halverson v. Convenient Food
Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 931 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972); In re United States Financial
Sec. Litigation, 69 F.R.D. 24, 38 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of
America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211
(3d Cir. 1976); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Ander-
son, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d
Cir. 1970). The availability of large fee awards in class actions is discussed in note
35 supra.
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attorney, a live issue, and the unnamed class members who have ac-
tual cases assures the adversariness stressed by the dissent in Sosna.
It should be understood, however, that the attorney's financial
stake in the outcome does not prove that there is a real claim for relief;
a live controversy is present because of the other non-party class mem-
bers on whose behalf the attorney is suing. Moreover, the lawyer's
interest alone would not be a sufficient guarantee of adequate repre-
sentation. At various points in the litigation the counsel's interest may
diverge from that of his clients-for example, when an early settle-
ment would maximize his profit but seriously compromise the interests
of the class members.1m It is the presence of the other protective de-
vices in rule 23 and the court's careful supervision of the litigation
as directed by the rule,8 4 in addition to counsel's interest, that prop-
erly guard the interests of the unnamed class members.
Obviously the approach just suggested requires a liberal and
flexible interpretation of rule 23 and necessarily rests on the premise
that there is a great need further to utilize the class action'35 because
it plays an important role in public interest litigation. A much more
literal and restrictive application of the rule also would be permissi-
ble.'8 6 The important thing to keep in mind is that in either event a
focus on the rule's prerequisites, rather than on standing or mootness
concepts, better clarifies the problems posed by a particular suit and
gives trial courts more direction as well as discretion in determining
whether to allow the action to proceed.
CONCLUSION
The need for a pluralistic solution to society's problems, taking
into account the proper roles of public and private attorneys general,
133. In recognition of the possibility of a potential conflict of interest between
counsel and the class, several courts have ruled that the attorney cannot also serve as
the formal class representative. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085
(3d Cir. 1976); Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1976); Shields v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971). But see Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 59
F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
134. In the settlement situation described in the text, rule 23(e) requires that the
court approve any compromise proposal, thereby guarding against the faint-hearted
representative or possibly unethical attorney.
135. See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
136. Compare the treatment of rule 23 in La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co.,
described in note 14 supra, with that in Haas v. Pittsburgh Natl Bank, 526 F.2d 1083
(3d Cir. 1975), a case involving similar facts in which the class allegations were
upheld.
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as well as class representatives, has been well documented. 17 The
legislature cannot be relied upon to remedy all social ills; the legis-
lative process is costly and time-consuming. Even more important, the
traditional role of the legislature has been to enact general statutes,
leaving it to the courts and administrative agencies to establish de-
tailed rules in order to enforce the laws. Thus, although congressional
action is absolutely necessary to define those areas of the public interest
that need protection, Congress is not and cannot be the sole guardian
of that interest. In addition, it has long been recognized that the bur-
den is too great for administrators to police the public interest and
that "private attorneys general" are needed to help in the struggle.188
Unfortunately, individual suits cannot suffice. Typically, they do not
involve sufficient potential damages to offset even the costs of litigation,
much less to provide an incentive to sue. Moreover, rigid standing
requirements often present insurmountable obstacles to the individ-
ual public interest litigant. Meanwhile, bad business and governmental
practices go unchecked. Professor Louis Jaffee eloquently summarized
the state of affairs when he said:
It has now become a commonplace that the individual citizen in our
vast, multitudinous complexes feels excluded from government. Thus
while governmental power expands, individual participation in the
exercise of power contracts. This is unfortunate because the feeling
of helplessness and exclusion is itself an evil, and because the indi-
viduals and organized groups are a source of information, experience
and wisdom.139
The class action provides one vehicle with sufficient incentive and
"clout" to respond to that need. Therefore, it is most important that
it not founder needlessly on the shoals that have impeded other public
interest suits.
Current case law sets the following boundaries. With regard to the
constitutional aspect of standing, the class representative must possess
a live grievance, although it may be against only one of the defendant
class members. The presence of a live controversy for mootness pur-
poses may be demonstrated by reference to the claims of the unnamed
137. See Capelletti, supra note 1, at 880.
138. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), reefd on
other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
139. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1033, 1044 (1968).
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class members. If these present an actual controversy, the mootness
of the representative's claim will not result in dismissal.
There is no need to limit this approach only to suits properly cer-
tified as class actions. The requirements of rule 23 provide an adequate
alternative for determining whether a suit should be allowed to pro-
ceed if the representative's claim becomes moot. If they are satisfied,
then the absence of formal certification proves nothing. By thus rely-
ing on the rule's requirements and interpreting them in light of their
purpose, the public interest value of class actions will be enhanced.
At the same time, the courts will have more than adequate means to
ensure that the public interest is being adequately protected, thereby
satisfying the prudential concerns of standing and mootness.
